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Good but Not Great: Autonomous
Vehicles and the Law in Florida 
Jeffery Mackowski*
PART I. INTRODUCTION
A bright sun shines in the crisp blue sky, beating down on Florida 
during a rather pleasant summer afternoon. Alice and Bob are happily 
married. Alice is a licensed driver in the state of Florida. Bob is blind, and 
he does not have a license to drive. Together, they own an autonomous 
vehicle (AV), colloquially known as a self-driving car. Alice and Bob want 
to travel to a restaurant for dinner. Once they both get in the AV, Alice 
indicates their destination and causes the AV to engage (i.e., Alice pushes 
the start button). The AV transports the couple safely to the restaurant, 
obeying all traffic laws, and utilizing public roadways. Alice’s sister, Carol, 
wants to join the couple for dinner. Alice sets the AV’s destination to 
Carol’s home and causes the AV to engage. While empty and without any 
human capable of taking control, the AV drives on public roadways to 
Carol’s home. Once there, Carol, a licensed driver, gets in the AV, sets the 
destination, and causes the AV to engage. Once again, the AV safely travels 
on public roadways without incident. Under Florida’s current motor vehicle 
laws, this scenario is perfectly legal.1
This scenario raises some interesting and important legal issues. Is AV 
technology a good idea? Who (or what) is the legal operator of the AV? 
Who is responsible if something goes wrong? Can an AV break the law? 
What impact does AV technology have on strict-liability noncriminal 
offenses? What about intoxicated driving? What happens if Alice uses the 
AV for illegal racing? Should the AV allow her to break the law? Can Bob, 
who does not have a driver license because he is blind, use the AV by 
himself? If he cannot, does it make sense to allow the AV to drive on public 
roadways without any human passengers? How should law enforcement be 
allowed to stop an AV? Who has standing to challenge a search of an AV? 
If a hacker took control of the AV, is this virtual car-jacking governed by 
existing law? Should all AVs be equipped with a “black box” type data 
*     J.D. Candidate, 2016, Florida International University College of Law. I am grateful for the 
invaluable feedback provided to me by Professor Eric Carpenter and the FIU Law Review. I owe special 
thanks to those who endeavor to make self-driving cars a reality. 
1 See FLA. STAT. § 316.85(1) (2014); see also Act effective July 1, 2012, ch. 2012-174, 2012 
Fla. Laws 1, 99 (“The Legislature finds that the state does not prohibit or specifically regulate the testing 
or operation of autonomous technology in motor vehicles on public roads.”). 
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recorder? Should law enforcement have special tools to address the use of 
AVs in the furtherance of crimes, such as drug smuggling? 
The idea that “the law lags behind technology” is generally agreed 
upon by policy makers, academia, and legal practitioners.2 AVs are poised 
to become commonplace in the not-too-distant future.3 The benefits of this 
technology are in the areas of safety, efficiency, and mobility.4 The 
traditional legal regime of automobiles assumes that the person in the 
driver’s seat of a vehicle is in control of that vehicle.5 An AV is capable of 
controlling itself, with or without a person in the vehicle, and this 
technological feat is not effectively addressed by the traditional automobile 
criminal liability regime.6 However, the AV laws in Florida are good in that 
they augment the traditional legal regime of automobiles to address the 
unique legal challenges posed by AVs, but are not great because they 
substantially limit the benefits of AV technology. 
This Comment will show how Florida’s current AV laws combined 
with the application of traditional automobile legal principles are sufficient 
to address the unique issues raised by AVs, and point out the missed 
opportunities of Florida’s AV legal paradigm to maximize the benefits of 
AV technology. This Comment is organized in six parts. Part I is this 
introduction. Part II provides an overview of AV technology. Part III will 
examine the benefits of AV technology. Part IV discusses and compares the 
current legal regimes of states with AV laws (Florida, Nevada, Michigan, 
and California) in order to show different approaches to resolving the legal 
issues that AVs present while maximizing their benefits. Part V identifies 
the unique legal issues regarding AVs, how Florida handles these issues, 
and how Florida could alter its AV legal regime to increase the benefits of 
AV technology. Finally, Part VI is a short conclusion summarizing the main 
points of the Comment. 
2 See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with 
Technological Change, 2 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 239 (2007). 
3 See Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA. L. REV. 1145, 
1149-52 (2012). 
4  Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues Created by Autonomous 
Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2012).
5  Julie Goodrich, Driving Miss Daisy: An Autonomous Chauffeur System, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 265,
281-82 (2013). 
6  Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1158. 
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PART II. AN OVERVIEW OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY
A.  The History of Autonomous Vehicles 
At the 1939 World’s Fair, General Motors predicted that by the 1960s, 
AVs would replace traditional automobiles.7 Development of AVs began in 
the 1980s with a European program called EUREKA PROMETHEUS.8
This program worked to develop driving systems that utilized “electronic 
traffic-flow monitors to increase communication among drivers and 
automatically detect any risk of collision.”9 Development of AVs was 
further spurred by the United States through its DARPA10 Grand 
Challenges, which sought to create AVs capable of operating in warzones.11
The “Google Car” is the most advanced AV in the world.12 The 
Google Car uses a sophisticated computer within the vehicle to process data 
from a variety of sensors, cameras, lasers, and GPS technology.13 This 
combination of computer hardware and software allows the AV to operate 
without any human interaction.14 It is unclear whether Google intends to 
manufacture its own AV or sell or license their AV technology suite to 
existing manufacturers.15 Automobile manufacturers are also developing 
their own technology. BMW, General Motors, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, 
Nissan, Tesla, Toyota, and Volvo are all developing AVs.16 Almost $10 
7 See, e.g., Chloe Albanesius, Google Car: Not the First Self-Driving Vehicle, PC MAG (Oct. 11, 
2010, 3:55 PM), www.pcmag.com/article2/0://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2370598,00.asp.
8  Nineteen European countries comprised the EUREKA program, which was a joint research 
and development program focused on getting innovative products to market. PROMETHEUS stands for 
the Program for European Traffic and Highest Efficiency and Unprecedented Safety. See David 
Dickson, EUREKA!, 91(6) TECH. REV. 26, 27-28 (1988).
9 See id.
10  DARPA stands for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, DARPA, www.darpa.mil/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
11  CHRISTIAN BERGER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO EXPERIENCE FROM THE DARPA URBAN
CHALLENGE 3, 4 (Christopher Rouff & Mike Hinchey eds., 2012). 
12 See John Lippert & Jack Clark, Google to Make Driverless Cars an Alphabet Company in 
2016, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Dec. 16, 2015, 12:16 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-
16/google-said-to-make-driverless-cars-an-alphabet-company-in-2016.
13 See The Diane Rehm Show: The Future of Driving (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 27, 2012, 
10:06 AM), 10:10:25 AM, thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-09-27/future-driving/transcript.
14 See Sebastian Thrun, What We’re Driving at, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 9, 2010), https://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html.
15 The Future of Driving, supra note 13, at 10:16:06 AM. 
16 See FLA. DEP’T. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Autonomous Vehicle Report,
#13-008, at 2 (2014); see also Larry Carley, Active Safety Technology: Adaptive Cruise Control, Lane 
Departure Warning & Collision Mitigation Braking, IMPORT CAR (June 16, 2009), www.import-
car.com/active-safety-technology-adaptive-cruise-control-lane-departure-warning-collision-mitigation-
braking/; Julie Goodrich, Driving Miss Daisy: An Autonomous Chauffeur System, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 265, 
268-72 (2013); Jose E. Naranjo et al., Using Fuzzy Logic in Automated Vehicle Control, IEEE
INTELLIGENT SYS. 36, 40 (Jan.–Feb. 2007) (“Almost all car manufacturers now offer [ADAS].”). 
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 115 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 115 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
C M
Y K
13 - MACKOWSKI_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/16 7:36 PM
224 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:221 
billion was spent on AV research and development in 2011, and this 
amount is predicted to increase to $130 billion by 2016.17
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has 
defined five levels of vehicle automation.18 At level 0, “[n]o-automation,” 
the driver is completely in control of the vehicle’s speed, steering, and other 
functions required for safe operation on the roadway (such as monitoring 
for pedestrians).19 At level 1, “function-specific automation,” the driver is 
still in control of the vehicle’s safe operation, but the vehicle has some 
technology that assists the driver with steering or speed, monitoring the 
roadway, or a combination of both.20 At level 2, “combined function 
automation,” the vehicle is capable of controlling both speed and steering 
such that the driver need only monitor the roadway and be available to take 
control “at all times and on short notice.”21 At level 3, “limited self-driving 
automation,” the vehicle assumes “safety-critical functions under certain 
traffic or environmental conditions . . . so that the driver is not expected to 
constantly monitor the roadway while driving.”22 At level 4, “full self-
driving automation,” the vehicle is in complete control of all functions, 
including monitoring the roadways, such that the vehicle is capable of 
operating while unoccupied.23 The discussion and analysis contained within 
this Comment is focused on level 4 AVs, full self-driving automation. The 
Florida Legislature recognizes the difference between an AV with full self-
driving automation and vehicles with lesser levels of automation.24
17 See Jim Motavalli, Self-Driving Cars Will Take Over by 2040, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2012, 11:39 
AM), www.forbes.com/sites/eco-nomics/2012/09/25/self-driving-cars-will-take-over-by-2040/ (cited by 
Racheal Roseman, Note, When AVs Take Over the Road: Rethinking the Expansion of the Fourth 
Amendment in a Technology-Driven World, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 n.49 (2013), http://
jolt.richmond.edu/v20il/article3.pdf.
18  NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY
CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4 (2013). 
19 Id. at 4. 
20 Id. (Examples of function specific automation include traditional cruise control and collision 
warning systems.). 
21 Id. at 5 (An example of combined function automation is adaptive cruise control, which 
maintains the vehicle’s speed relative to the other traffic on the roadway, and lane centering, which 
steers the vehicle without a driver’s input.). 
22 Id. (An example of limited self-driving automation is a self-driving car that alerts the driver 
when it encounters a condition, such as a construction zone, where the automation system will not 
function properly.). 
23 Id. (At this level of automation, “safe operation rests solely on the automated vehicle 
system.”).
24 See FLA. STAT. § 316.003(90) (2015) (Defining an AV as “[a]ny vehicle equipped with 
autonomous technology. The term ‘autonomous technology’ means technology installed on a motor 
vehicle that has the capability to drive the vehicle on which the technology is installed without the active 
control or monitoring by a human operator. The term excludes a motor vehicle enabled with active 
safety systems or driver assistances systems . . . unless any such system alone or in combination with 
other systems enables the vehicle on which the technology is installed to drive without the active control 
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B.  Current Technology Limitations 
Fully automated technology is “very early stage technology.”25
Google’s fully autonomous car can operate on a roadway without any 
“extra cautious driving to avoid making a mistake . . . only if intricate 
preparations have been made beforehand.”26 Google’s fully autonomous car 
has many unresolved issues including driving in snow or heavy rain.27
Other issues include “big, open parking lots or multilevel garages . . . [and] 
being blinded when the sun is directly behind a light.”28 Limitations of the 
car’s sensors mean that it “can’t tell if a road obstacle is a rock or a 
crumpled piece of paper, so the car will try to drive around either. . . . [T]he 
car can’t detect potholes or spot an uncovered manhole if it isn’t coned 
off.”29
Despite these current limitations, experts in the field of self-driving 
vehicles (academics, engineers, researchers, and automobile industry 
insiders) agree that between 2015 and 2025 fully automated AVs will 
surpass human drivers in all safety metrics.30
PART III. THE BENEFITS OF AV TECHNOLOGY:
SAFETY, EFFICIENCY, AND MOBILITY
The benefits of AVs fall into three categories: (1) safety; (2) 
efficiency; and (3) mobility.31 The Florida legislature recognized efficiency 
and mobility when it enacted statutes authorizing the use of AVs on public 
roads.32 Each of these three categories is discussed briefly below. 
A.  Safety 
Automobile accidents in the United States are a serious public health 
concern.33 Operator error accounts for over 95 percent of all automobile 
or monitoring by a human operator.”) (emphasis added). 
25  Lee Gomes, Hidden Obstacles for Google’s Self-Driving Cars: Impressive Progress Hides 
Major Limitations of Google’s Quest for Automated Driving, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 28, 2014), 
www.technologyreview.com/news/530276/hidden-obstacles-for-googles-self-driving-cars.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30  Dan Carney, Ready to Nap Behind the Wheel? The Road to Self-Driving Cars Remains a 
Long One, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 14, 2014), www.digitaltrends.com/cars/self-driving-cars-far-flung-
future-or-almost-here.
31 See Beiker, supra note 3, at 1150–52; see also Gary Marchant & Rachel Lindor, The Coming 
Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1322 
(2012).
32 See Staff Analysis, H.B. 599, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012).
33  JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR 
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accidents.34 In the United States in 2010, “32,788 people were killed in 
motor vehicle traffic crashes.”35 Given that operator error is the major cause 
of these fatalities, it follows that reducing or even completely removing the 
role of the operator will decrease the number of accidents thus saving 
lives.36 In addition to saving lives and reducing injuries, the use of AVs will 
reduce property damage as well.37 Simply put, self-driving cars are safer 
than human-operated cars. 
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has examined the 
likely potential impact that AVs will have on automobile safety, concluding 
that “AV technology can dramatically reduce the frequency of crashes.”38
Automobile features categorized at the level 0 and level 1 of automation, 
such as lane departure warning and forward collision warning, could 
prevent an estimated one-third of fatal automobile accidents.39 Drug and 
alcohol impaired drivers, distracted drivers, and fatigued drivers are the 
cause of 40 percent of fatal automobile accidents.40 Level 4 technology is 
capable of eliminating these underlying human conditions by allowing the 
AV to take control of the automobile.41
B.  Efficiency 
AVs are more convenient to share than traditional vehicles.  
Many families now own more than one car, to satisfy the needs of two 
working spouses and a teenager or two. When a single car can drop 
one person off at work, and then drive home to drop off the next 
person, and then shuttle the kids to school and after-school events, and 
then pick up the parents at the end of the day, demand for cars may 
POLICYMAKERS xiv (2014), www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-1.html. 
34 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811.059, NATIONAL MOTOR
VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY 31 (2008), www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811059.PDF (cited in 
Beiker, supra note 3, at 1149) (Road conditions, weather, and technical failure account for the remaining 
five percent.). 
35  Beiker, supra note 3, at 1149 (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 
811.059, NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY (2008)). 
36 See generally Matthew Moore & Beverly Lu, Autonomous Vehicles for Personal Transport: 
A Technology Assessment (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, 2011), 
www.pickar.caltech.edu/e103/Final%20Exams/Autonomous%20Vehicles%20for%20Personal%20Trans
port.pdf (cited in Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1322) (discussing the ability of “autonomous 
vehicles to reduce the frequency and/or severity of traffic accidents”).  
37 See Beiker, supra note 3, at 1150 (“There is clear evidence that . . . complete vehicle 
autonomy can significantly reduce property damage, injuries and casualties.”). 
38  ANDERSON, supra note 33, at xiv. 
39 Id. at 15. 
40  Adam Ozimek, The Massive Economic Benefits of Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2014, 
9:28 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2014/11/08/the-massive-economic-benefits-of-self-
driving-cars.
41  ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 16. 
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plummet. One car may provide ample transportation for not just one 
family, but several.42
Traffic congestion is part of the operation of traditional vehicles in the 
United States, and traffic congestion “leads to unproductive time of about 
thirty-six hours for the average commuter each year.”43 There is also the 
monetary loss of $87.2 billion per year from vehicle fuel that is consumed 
needlessly because of traffic congestion.44 AV technology counters both of 
these inefficiencies. First, the AV allows the person inside to be a 
passenger, rather than an operator, and thus able to conduct productive tasks 
(or take a nap) essentially transforming the vehicle into a virtual office (or 
bedroom). Second, in a transportation scheme where all vehicles are 
autonomous, coordinated traffic “can lead to a fuel saving in the order of 
20-25%.”45
Estimates suggest that the automobile insurance industry will benefit 
as the number of traffic accidents is reduced by AVs, resulting in auto 
insurance premium reductions of over $37 billion per year in the United 
States.46
C.  Mobility 
If one assumes that a person inside an AV is a passenger, then the 
existing infrastructure of our current roadway system becomes available to 
individuals who cannot operate traditional vehicles. AVs “can help elderly 
or disable citizens keep an active lifestyle such as running daily errands and 
maintaining social relationships.”47 The same is true for teenagers. AV 
technology will surely benefit individuals with cognitive or visual 
impairments. 
An important aspect of the benefit to mobility provided by AVs is that 
AV technology can utilize already existing infrastructure.48 Individuals with 
cognitive or visual impairments can ride as a passenger in an AV on the 
42  Mark Herrmann, Why Driverless Cars Will Wreck Your Legal Practice, ABOVE THE LAW
(Aug. 11, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/08/why-driverless-cars-will-wreck-your-
legal-practice/?rf=1.
43  Beiker, supra note 3, at 1150.
44 Id. (citing David Schrank & Tim Lomax, 2009 Urban Mobility Report, TEXAS TRANSP.
INSTIT. THE TEXAS A&M UNIV. SYS. 1, 1 (2009)). 
45 Id. at 1151. 
46 See Joseph A. Dallegro, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Will Change Everything,
INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/052014/how-googles-selfdriving-car-will-
change-everything.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2016); see also Beiker, supra note 3, at 1151. 
47  Beiker, supra note 3, at 1151. 
48  There is research and development into technology known as vehicle communication systems 
that require substantial and costly changes to infrastructure. See The Future of Driving, supra note 13, at 
10:24:33AM–10:25:49AM.
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very same roads that exist today. This is a massive increase in independence 
provided by the mobility of AVs. A blind person could own (or share) an 
AV to run errands or pursue leisure activities rather than rely on friends, 
relatives, government sponsored aid workers, or public transportation. In 
addition to people with impairments, parents could send their children to 
school or daycare without leaving work. The family AV would function as 
a personal, and flawless, chauffeur. 
However, in Florida, an AV must always be operated by a person and 
engaged by a licensed driver.49 This significantly hinders the benefit of 
mobility. A blind person still must rely on someone with a valid driver 
license, to engage the AV on his or her behalf. A son or daughter being 
picked-up from high school also needs a licensed driver to actually engage 
the AV. This may be as simple as having a person with a valid driver 
license remotely engage the AV, perhaps by use of a smartphone. This 
remote activation, however, is still inconvenient and nowhere near as 
simple as allowing a person without a driver license, such as a blind 
individual, to engage an AV on his or her own. This issue would be 
resolved if Florida recognized that an AV operates itself and removes the 
requirement that the operator of an AV have a valid driver license. If there 
is a malfunction in an AV with a blind occupant, what difference does it 
make if the blind person engaged the AV or if a licensed driver engaged the 
AV remotely? There is no difference whatsoever. The same goes for a 
child. In either event, the person who engaged the AV is liable for any 
resulting harm, which is ridiculous. The harm here is caused by either a 
manufacturing defect or something other than the AV, but in no situation is 
the harm caused by a person who tells the AV, remotely, “drive to the high 
school.”
PART IV. THE LEGAL PARADIGM OF AUTOMOBILES
A.  An Overview of Traditional Motor Vehicle Laws and Regulations 
Most crimes have a mens rea element.50 Although there are some strict 
liability vehicular crimes,51 the general rule is that vehicular crimes “have 
intent requirements [that] depend on a person being ‘in control’ of a motor 
49 See FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (2015). 
50 See Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the 
Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 21 (2001) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.44 
(3d ed. 2000)). 
51  Florida statutes governing motor vehicles classify most strict liability vehicular offenses as 
“noncriminal traffic infraction[s], punishable as a moving violation.” FLA. STAT. § 316.183 (2015). But
see FLA. STAT. § 316.191 (2015) (making racing on highways a strict liability misdemeanor of the first 
degree).
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 118 Side A      04/28/2016   10:11:02
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 118 Side A      04/28/2016   10:11:02
C M
Y K
13 - MACKOWSKI_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/16 7:36 PM
2015] Autonomous Vehicles and the Law in Florida 229
vehicle.”52 There are four broad categories of vehicular offenses: (1) strict 
liability offenses;53 (2) offenses with an intent requirement;54 (3) offenses 
that require “a person having control of a vehicle;”55 and (4) offenses 
“where the owners of vehicles are vicariously liable for the actions of the 
drivers.”56
The discussion will focus on the criminal liability regime as it pertains 
to offenses that require: (1) an intent element; and (2) a person be in control 
of the vehicle. Reckless driving, vehicular manslaughter, and driving under 
the influence all have an intent element as well as require a person to be in 
control of the vehicle. Strict liability offenses pose an interesting issue 
because one of the strongest promises of AVs is a car that always has a 
flawless driver.57
In Florida, the criminal offense of Reckless Driving requires an intent 
element of “willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or 
property.”58 In Florida, vehicular homicide is a felony59 with an intent 
element of recklessness.60 The Florida statute prohibiting driving under the 
influence (DUI) does not contain an express intent element.61 However, a 
prima facie element of the DUI offense is that the person is under the 
influence of an intoxicating substance “to the extent that the person’s 
normal faculties are impaired.”62 This element of intoxication itself requires 
more than strict liability, at least implicitly.63 The important language from 
Florida’s DUI statute, as it pertains to this Comment, is the phrase “if the 
person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle.”64 The analysis 
52  Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1158. 
53 Id. at 1159 (Examples of strict liability vehicular offenses include “speeding infractions, 
driving without proof of insurance, and even parking tickets.”). 
54 Id. (“These include any vehicular crime that has a mens rea requirement—most notably, 
criminal vehicular homicide.”) (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.21 (2011)). 
55 Id. (using implied consent as an example) (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 23612 (2012)). 
56 Id. (using “automated enforcement of speeding and red-light-running” as an example) (citing 
652 ILCS 5/11-208.88 (2011)).
57  Beiker, supra note 3, at 1149–50. 
58  FLA. STAT. § 316.192(1)(a) (2015). 
59  FLA. STAT. § 782.071 (2015) (“Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being, or the 
killing of an unborn child by any injury to the mother, caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by 
another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.”). 
60 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 50, at 33 (defining recklessness as a conscious disregard for a 
known danger). 
61 See FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1)(a)–(c) (2015). 
62  FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1)(a) (2015). 
63 See FLA. STAT. § 775.051 (2015) (“Voluntary intoxication resulting from the consumption, 
injection, or other use of alcohol or other controlled substance as described in chapter 893 is not a 
defense to any offense proscribed by law. Evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is not 
admissible to show that the defendant lacked the specific intent to commit an offense.”) (emphasis 
added).
64  FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1) (2015). 
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to determine what “in actual physical control of a vehicle” means in the 
context of a fully AV is discussed in depth in Part III, B of this Comment. 
B.  The Current Legal Regime of AVs 
Currently, Nevada, California, Michigan, the District of Columbia, and 
Florida have enacted laws specifically governing the use of AVs.65 These 
statutes explicitly legalize the operation of AVs on normal roadways that 
are used by traditional vehicles; the self-driving car is permitted to share the 
road with the traditional car.66 An examination of these enacted statutes 
indicates that “[d]river liability appears to be a foremost concern for the 
legislators proposing autonomous vehicle legislation.”67 This section will 
examine the statutes of Florida, Nevada, California, and Michigan.
1.  The Laws of Florida 
The operation of AVs in Florida became legal on July 1, 2012.68 As of 
January 1, 2015, Florida has six statutes that pertain to AVs.69 Title XXIII, 
Motor Vehicles, of the Florida Statutes governs almost all of AV 
operations.70 In Florida, an “AV” is defined as “[a]ny vehicle equipped with 
autonomous technology. The term ‘autonomous technology’ means 
technology . . . that has the capability to drive the vehicle . . . without the 
active control or monitoring by a human operator.”71 The 2012 Florida 
session laws required that “[b]y February 12, 2014, the Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles shall submit a report to the 
[Legislature] recommending additional legislative or regulatory action that 
65  CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2015); D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 257.663, 257.665 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.86 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 482A.100 (LexisNexis 2013) (cited in Swanson, infra note 66, at 1097). 
66 See Andrew Swanson, “Somebody Grab the Wheel!”: State AV Legislation and the Road to a 
National Regime, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 1085, 1096 (2014); see also Bryant Walker Smith, Automated
Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 516 (2014) (contending 
that despite express legislation, AVs are probably legal to operate on public streets anywhere in the 
United States because “[c]urrent law probably does not prohibit automated vehicles—but may 
nonetheless discourage their introduction or complicate their operation”). 
67  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1118. 
68  Act effective July 1, 2012, ch. 2012-174, 2012 Fla. Laws 1, 101.
69  These six statutes are FLA. STAT. § 316.003(25) (2015) (defining an operator, generally); §
316.003(90) (2015) (defining an AV); § 316.305(3)(b)(7) (2015) (exempting an AV operators from 
Florida’s ban on texting while driving); § 316.85 (2015) (establishing AV operator’s requirements and 
defining “operator” relating to an AV); § 316.86 (establishing AV testing procedures); § 319.145 (2015) 
(requiring AVs “to meet federal standards and regulations,” have an operator disengage system, have a 
malfunction alert, obey state traffic laws, and allowing federal regulations preemption); and § 627.
0653(6) (2015) (permitting the Office of Insurance Regulation to discount insurance on a vehicle 
“equipped with autonomous driving technology”). 
70 See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 316, 319 (2015). 
71  FLA. STAT. § 316.003(90) (2014).
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may be required for the safe testing and operation of motor vehicles 
equipped with autonomous technology.”72
The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) 
submitted the required report (DHSMV report) on February 10, 2014.73 The 
DHSMV report states that the “current Florida laws are brief, requiring a 
licensed driver, unless on a closed course, to monitor the autonomous mode 
and intervene, when necessary.”74 The DHSMV report references AV 
legislation enacted in Nevada, California, the District of Columbia, 
Michigan, and Ontario, Canada.75
The DHSMV report is flawed. The DHSMV had twenty-one months to 
submit its report, “recommending additional legislative or regulatory 
action,” to the Florida Legislature.76 During those twenty-one months, the 
DHSMV not only “participated in the Autonomous Vehicle Summit,” but 
was “also involved extensively in autonomous vehicle research, planning, 
and outreach.”77 Yet despite all this effort, the DHSMV created a report that 
is a mere seven pages.78
The DHSMV report relies heavily on the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) recommendations.79 The DHSMV report 
is careful to point out that these are just recommendations and the “NHTSA 
has not established safety standards for autonomous vehicles.”80 The 
DHSMV “reviewed NHTSA’s recommendations and practices in other 
states to determine if Florida’s current laws are satisfactory.”81 After a 
review of the NHTSA recommendations, the report finds that current 
Florida laws satisfy only four of the eight recommendations.82 After 
72  Act effective July 1, 2012, ch. 2012-174, 2012 Fla. Laws 1, 101. 
73  JULIE L. JONES, FLA. DEP’T. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLE REPORT 1 (2014), www.flhsmv.gov/html/HSMVAutonomousVehicleReport2014.pdf 
[hereinafter AV Report]. 
74 Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). 
75 Id.
76 See Act effective July 1, 2012, ch. 2012-174, 2012 Fla. Laws 1, 101. 
77 See AV Report, supra note 73, at 6 (2014).
78 Id. at 1–7 (The DHSMV report actually contains only six pages of text (2,779 words); the 
first page is a cover page.).
79 Id. at 3–6 (2014). 
80 Id. at 3. 
81 Id. at 4. 
82 See id. at 3; see also Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Preliminary Statement of 
Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles, at 11–14 (2013), www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/
Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf. The NHTSA recommends that states: (1) “Ensure that the driver 
understands how to operate a self-driving vehicle safely;” (2) “Ensure that on-road testing of self-driving 
vehicles minimizes risks to other road users;” (3) “Limit testing operations to roadway, traffic and 
environmental conditions suitable for the capabilities of the tested self-driving vehicles;” (4) “Establish 
reporting requirements to monitor the performance of self-driving technology during testing;” (5) 
“Ensure that the process for transitioning from self-driving mode to driver control is safe, simple, and 
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establishing the metric for determining whether Florida’s current laws are 
satisfactory, and then finding that they are not, the DHSMV makes a single 
recommendation, “The Department recommends that the State of Florida 
establish working relationships with motor vehicle manufacturers and 
technology developers to encourage these business opportunities.”83 After 
all due consideration, the DHSMV “proposes no changes to existing Florida 
laws and rules at this time.”84
Why, after finding that the current Florida laws meet only half of the 
NHTSA’s recommendations, does the DHSMV make a single 
recommendation and go on to propose no changes to Florida law rather than 
offer solutions (including solutions from other states’ statutes)? In part, the 
DHSMV correctly understands that the difference between 
recommendations and standards.85 Further, Florida’s current laws require 
that any AV operated in Florida “is required to comply with existing federal 
and state safety and traffic regulations.”86 Ultimately, the DHSMV simply 
throws up its hands and declares that “[p]olicy-making at this juncture is 
difficult, at best.”87
1.? Operation and Testing Purposes 
Not only is the DHSMV report flawed in its single recommendation 
and lack of proposals, but it misinterprets Florida’s current AV laws. The 
DHSMV report clearly references both section 316.85 and 316.86. This is 
evident in the report’s statement that “[t]he person who engages the 
autonomous technology is deemed the operator,”88 which is a clear 
reference to Florida Statute section 316.85(2).89 The DHSMV report claims 
that “the Florida Legislature authorized the testing of AVs in Florida.”90
The DHSMV report also concludes that “[c]urrent Florida laws allow 
manufacturers of autonomous technology to test on Florida’s public 
timely;” (6) “Self-driving test vehicles should have the capability of detecting, recording, and informing 
the driver that the system of automated technologies has malfunctioned;” (7) “Ensure that the 
installation and operation of any self-driving vehicle technologies does not disable any federally 
required safety features or systems;” and (8) “Ensure that self-driving test vehicles record information 
about the status of the automated control technologies in the event of a crash or lass of vehicle control.” 
83  AV Report, supra note 73, at 7 (2014). 
84 Id.
85 Id. (“[T]here are no national safety standards and many unknowns.”). 
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(2) (2014) (“[A] person shall be deemed to be the operator of an AV 
operating in autonomous mode when the person causes the vehicle’s autonomous technology to 
engage.”).
90  AV Report, supra note 73, at 2 (2014). 
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roadways.”91 The DHSMV report does not address AV operation for non-
testing purposes.92
I contend that the DHSMV report mistakenly interprets Florida’s AV 
statutes to limit AV to testing only.93 In fact, of the six Florida statutes that 
pertain to AVs, only section 316.86 mentions “testing purposes.”94 When 
all of the applicable statutes are considered together, along with the 
legislative intent of these statutes, it is clear that the operation of AVs for 
non-testing purposes is permitted on the public roadways of Florida. Most 
pertinent to the discussion of whether current Florida laws only permit 
testing of AV are sections 316.85 and 316.86 of the Florida Statutes, which 
were both created by the 2012 Florida session laws.95
The text of Florida Statue section 316.85 is96:
AVs; operation.— 
(1) A person who possesses a valid driver license may operate an AV 
in autonomous mode. 
(2) For purposes of this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, 
a person shall be deemed to be the operator of an AV operating in 
autonomous mode when the person causes the vehicle’s autonomous 
technology to engage, regardless of whether the person is physically 
present in the vehicle while the vehicle is operating in autonomous 
mode.97
The text of Florida Statute section 316.86 is98:
Operation of vehicles equipped with autonomous technology on roads 
for testing purposes; financial responsibility; exemption from liability 
for manufacturer when third party converts vehicle.— 
(1) Vehicles equipped with autonomous technology may be operated 
on roads in this state by employees, contractors, or other persons 
designated by manufacturers of autonomous technology, or by 
research organizations associated with accredited educational 
91 Id. at 7. 
92 See generally AV Report, supra note 73. 
93 But see John W. Terwilleger, Navigating the Road Ahead: Florida’s Autonomous Vehicle 
Statute and Its Effect on Liability, 89 FLA. BAR J. 26, 28 (2015) (“Autonomous vehicles may be used 
only for testing purposes.”). 
94 See FLA. STAT. §§ 316.003(25), 316.003(90), 316.305(3)(b)(7), 316.85, 316.86, 319.145, and 
627.0653(6).
95  2012 Fla. Laws ch. 2012-174, 100–01. 
96  The text of Florida Statute § 316.85 is identical to the session law text in which it was 
enacted. 2012 Fla. Laws ch. 2012-174, 100. 
97  FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (2014). 
98  The text of Florida Statute § 316.86 is identical to the session law text in which it was 
enacted. 2012 Fla. Laws ch. 2012-174, 101. 
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institutions, for the purpose of testing the technology. For testing 
purposes, a human operator shall be present in the AV such that he or 
she has the ability to monitor the vehicle’s performance and intervene, 
if necessary, unless the vehicle is being tested or demonstrated on a 
closed course. Before the start of testing in this state, the entity 
performing the testing must submit to the department an instrument of 
insurance, surety bond, or proof of self-insurance acceptable to the 
department in the amount of $5 million. 
(2) The original manufacturer of a vehicle converted by a third party 
into an AV shall not be liable in, and shall have a defense to and be 
dismissed from, any legal action brought against the original 
manufacturer by any person injured due to an alleged vehicle defect 
caused by the conversion of the vehicle, or by equipment installed by 
the converter, unless the alleged defect was present in the vehicle as 
originally manufactured.99
The DHSMV’s interpretation creates inconsistency between the 
various Florida laws that govern AVs and violates the legislative intent. An 
interpretation of the plain language of the statutes leads to the conclusion 
that current Florida laws do not limit the operation of AVs on Florida’s 
public roadways to testing purposes. This conclusion is further bolstered by 
the legislative intent behind the statutes. 
The scope of these two sections is drastically different, and based on 
the plain language of the statutes, it is clear that section 316.85 is broad and 
section 316.86 is narrow. Section 316.85(2) begins with the language, “For 
purposes of this chapter,” clearly establishing that this subsection applies 
broadly to the entirety of Chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes.100 The title 
language of section 316.86, which begins, “Operation of vehicles equipped 
with autonomous technology on roads for testing purposes,” establishes that 
section 316.86 is narrow in its scope, and does not apply to any other 
statute.101 While the Florida statutes do not define the term “testing,” that 
term, as it relates to AVs, is only used in section 316.86.102 The plain 
language of section 316.85(2) demonstrates that AVs may be operated for 
any purpose, not solely for testing purposes, because this section applies to 
the testing section (316.86) as well as the entirety of Chapter 316, State 
Uniform Traffic Control.103
99    FLA. STAT. § 316.86 (2014). 
100  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(2) (2014). 
101  FLA. STAT. § 316.86 (2014) (emphasis added). 
102 See FLA. STAT. § 316.003(25), 316.003(90), 316.305(3)(b)(7), 316.85, 316.86, 319.145, and 
627.0653(6). The use of the term “testing” in Chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes generally relates to 
driver impairment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.1934.
103 See FLA. STAT. §§ 316.001–316.86 (2014). 
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Another inconsistency is who may operate an AV. Florida Statutes 
section 316.85(1) permits any person with a valid driver license to operate 
an AV.104 This statute does not place any other restrictions or requirements 
on the potential operator, such as having a Florida driver license, passing a 
test using an AV, taking an AV certification course, or having an AV 
endorsement on the potential operator’s license.105 In contrast, section 
316.86(1) limits the operation of an AV in Florida to “employees, 
contractors, or other persons designated by [manufactures or educational 
institutes].”106 The specific limitations on operators of AVs for testing 
purposes established by section 316.86 makes sense when this section is 
construed narrowly; likewise, the less restrictive mandate on permissible 
AV operators established in section 316.85 makes sense when this section 
is broadly construed. 
Staying within the four corners of these statutes, the next inconsistency 
concerns whether a person need be inside an AV. Florida Statutes section 
316.85 uses language that expressly indicates that an AV may operate 
“regardless of whether the person is physically present in the vehicle.”107
Compare this to Florida Statutes section 316.86 which requires that “[f]or 
testing purposes, a human operator shall be present in the AV such that he 
or she has the ability to monitor the vehicle’s performance and 
intervene.”108
If the DHSMV report is correct by indicating that, in Florida, an AV 
may only be operated for testing purposes, then “a human operator shall be 
present”109 in the AV at all times, thus making the language of Florida 
Statute section 316.85(2), “regardless of whether the person is physically 
present” excess and surplus text that serves no purpose. The DHSMV 
report’s assertion that any AV operation in Florida is solely for testing 
purposes, although not stating this expressly, may interpret these portions of 
the statute to coexist. Perhaps the language in section 316.85(2) is simply 
meant to attach culpability to a tester-operator that, for whatever reason, 
engages an empty AV remotely. 
This interpretation, that the text of section 316.85(2) is merely a 
prophylactic to assign legal blame in the event of a mishap, is absurd given 
that: (1) section 316.86 requires that “a human operator shall be present” 
104  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(1) (2014). 
105  As of January 2015, the state of Florida does not offer any testing, certification, or 
endorsements pertaining to AVs. 
106  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(1) (2014). 
107  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(2) (2014). 
108  FLA. STAT. § 316.86(1) (2014). 
109 Id.
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during the testing of an AV;110 and (2) section 316.86’s insurance 
requirements.111 There is no logical reason to conclude that section 
316.86(1) relies on section 316.85(2) to determine the operator of an AV on 
public roads for testing purposes. Section 316.86 not only requires that the 
operator of the AV be physically present in the AV, it requires a human 
operator to be present in the testing AV, “unless the vehicle is being tested 
or demonstrated on a closed course.”112 Although term “closed course” is 
not defined by Florida law,113 the plain usage of the term means roadways 
not accessible to the public.114 Interpreting Florida laws to limit AV use “for 
testing purposes” only means that a human operator will be present in the 
AV when the AV is on public roadways, but this interpretation cannot 
coexist with the plain language from 316.85 that confirms an AV may 
operate “regardless of whether the person is physically present in the 
vehicle.”115
The need to assign culpability to a specific operator is not necessary 
given section 316.86’s requirement that “the entity performing the testing 
must submit to the department [of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] an 
instrument of insurance . . . in the amount of $5 million.”116 This drastically 
limits the need to assign legal blame to the operator of an AV on a closed 
course (the only place AV testing may take place without a human operator) 
because the testing entity (with their $5 million dollars of insurance) is 
legally responsible for unoccupied AV. Further, if interpreted to apply to 
the entirety of Florida’s AV laws, the financial responsibility clause of 
section 316.86 is inconsistent with section 627.0653. Section 627.0653(6) 
authorizes the Office of Insurance Regulation to approve a discount on 
insurance premiums for AVs.117 If these statutes are construed to limit AV 
operation to testing purposes only, then the requirement that the testing 
entity have $5 million dollars of insurance coverage contradicts the 
authorization of discounted insurance for AVs. 
Yet another inconsistency that results from construing Florida laws to 
restrict AVs to testing only is seen in Florida’s ban on texting while driving. 
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See FLA. STAT. § 316.003 (2014); see also AV Report, supra note 73, at 2 n.1. 
114 See, e.g., Off-highway Vehicles Closed Courses, NOVASCOTIA.CA, http://NovaScotia.ca/natr/
ohv/courses.asp (last visited February 16, 2016) (“[A] closed course is a facility which is designed and 
managed to provide a safe, controlled environment . . . .”). 
115  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(2) (2014). 
116  FLA. STAT. § 316.86(1) (2014). 
117  FLA. STAT. § 627.0653(6) (2014) (“The Office of Insurance Regulation may approve a 
premium discount to any rates, rating schedules, or ratings manuals for liability, personal injury 
protection, and collision coverages . . . if the insured vehicle is equipped with autonomous driving 
technology.”).
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The Florida Ban on Texting While Driving Law allows law enforcement to 
“issue citations as a secondary offense to persons who are texting while 
driving.”118 This law “does not apply to a motor vehicle operator who is . . . 
[o]perating an AV . . . in autonomous mode.”119 Section 316.86 requires 
that the operator of an AV for testing purposes must have “the ability to 
monitor the vehicle’s performance and intervene, if necessary.”120 Given 
this heightened concern for an operator’s focused attention on an AV being 
tested, the exemption provided to AVs by the Florida Ban on Texting While 
Driving Law is contradictory because it specifically allows an AV operator 
to be distracted by texting. The reasonable interpretation is that exemption 
for AVs provided by the Florida Ban on Texting While Driving Law exists 
because, in Florida, AVs may be operated on public roadways for purposes 
other than testing. 
The best support for the DHSMV’s interpretation that Florida’s current 
laws only permit the operation of AVs for testing purposes is found in 
section 316.86, “Vehicles equipped with autonomous technology may be 
operated on roads in this state by [specified persons], for the purpose of 
testing the technology.”121 Here, omitted language is just as important as 
what is included. Section 316.85 places a single restriction on the operation 
of an AV, possession of a valid driver license.122 There is no mention of 
where an AV may operate, nor is there any mention of AV operation for 
testing purposes only.123 Similarly, section 316.86 does not use a limiting 
term such as “only.”124 Common sense dictates that the lack of restrictors in 
section 316.85 means AVs may be operated in Florida for purposes other 
than testing. A plain language construction of the phrase “for testing 
purposes” means that the phrase is self-limiting. It is meant to confine the 
provisions of section 316.86(1) only to AVs used for testing purposes. 
The operation of AVs for purposes other than testing is supported by 
the statutes’ legislative intent. The legislative intent of Florida’s AV statutes 
is found within the 2012 Florida session laws: 
It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage the safe development, 
testing, and operation of motor vehicles with autonomous technology 
on the public roads of the state. The Legislature finds that the state 
does not prohibit or specifically regulate the testing or operation of 
118  FLA. STAT. § 316.305(1)(d) (2014). 
119  FLA. STAT. § 316.305(3)(b) (2014). 
120  FLA. STAT. § 316.86(1) (2014). 
121  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(1) (2014) (emphasis added). 
122  Id.
123 See FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (2014). 
124 See id.
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autonomous technology in motor vehicles on public roads.125
Although this text from the session law was not codified,126 it was still 
approved by Governor Rick Scott and provides a lens by which to examine 
the statutes that were codified in order to help clarify the current state of the 
law. The phrase “testing or operation” is a clear indication that the Florida 
Legislature considers the use of AVs for testing purposes something 
different than the operation of AVs because of the use of “or.” The use of 
the word “or,” rather than “and,” shows that the Legislature is aware that 
the AVs can be used for testing purposes or operated for transportation 
purposes. This is reflected in the enactment of sections 316.85 and 316.86 
as separate pieces of legislation as well as the interrelationships between all 
of Florida’s current AV laws. 
It is important to note that unlike many other sections of Florida 
Statutes Chapter 316, there are no specific punishments for violations of 
sections 316.85 or 316.86.127 Florida law does provide that a driver 
convicted of a violation of any offense prohibited by chapter 316 that 
results in an accident “may have his or her driving privileges revoked.”128
So even if the DHSMV is correct and AVs may only be operated for testing 
purposes, a person who violates this law is only subject to a suspension of 
driving privileges if an accident occurs. Regardless of the interpretation of 
Florida’s AV laws, enforcement is difficult because those laws lack teeth. 
2.  The Laws of Nevada 
An examination of Nevada’s legislation governing the use of AVs 
reveals that Nevada legislators do not want the issue of criminal liability to 
go before the courts as a matter of first impression without legislative intent 
to guide the judicial branch.129 The Nevada statute offers key definitions for 
the terms “autonomous system,” “AV,” and “manufacturer.”130 The 
legislation enacted in Nevada is not self-executing, rather it mandates that 
the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) adopts regulations to 
govern the use of AVs in the state.131 On February 15, 2012, Nevada’s 
DMV adopted such regulations.132
The Nevada’s DMV regulations “anticipate the hindering of existing 
vehicles, the possible malfunctions that may require user override, and the 
125  2012 Fla. Laws ch. 2012-174, 99 (emphasis added). 
126 See FLA. STAT. § 316 (2014). 
127 See id.
128  FLA. STAT. § 316.665(2) (2014). 
129  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1118. 
130  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1110–11. 
131  NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.100 (2014) (cited in Swanson, supra note 66). 
132  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A (2014) (cited in Swanson, supra note 66). 
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uncertainty of blame that my result from a tort suit.”133 The Nevada 
regulations specifically state that they apply to fully AV systems and not to 
already existing ADAS such as “a safety system or driver assistance 
system, including, without limitation, a system to provide electronic blind 
spot assistance, crash avoidance, emergency braking, parking assistance, 
adaptive cruise control, lane keep assistance, lane departure warnings and 
traffic jam and queuing assistance.”134 This legislative scheme is designed 
to prevent users of existing technology from “becoming unexpectedly 
regulated by a new legal regime.”135
The Nevada regulations place a premium on the safety of the other 
vehicles and their drivers that share the road with AVs. The regulation 
requires an override switch, a mechanism that disengages the autonomous 
technology and allows the person that utilized the mechanism to take 
control of the vehicle manually.136 Additionally, the regulations require that 
a notification alert system activates when there is a malfunction with the 
autonomous technology with the intent that a passenger thus alerted will 
engage the override mechanism.137 Seemingly with an eye towards both 
civil and criminal liability, the Nevada regulations require that any AV: 
[Have] a separate mechanism in addition to, and separate from, any 
other mechanism required by law, to capture and store the autonomous 
technology sensor data for at least 30 seconds before a collision occurs 
between the AV and another vehicle, object or natural person while the 
vehicle is operating in autonomous mode. The autonomous technology 
sensor data must be captured and stored in a read-only format by the 
mechanism so that the data is retained until extracted from the 
mechanism by an external device capable of downloading and storing 
the data. Such data must be preserved for 3 years after the date of 
collision. The provisions of this paragraph do not authorize or require 
the modification of any other mechanism to record data that is installed 
on the AV in compliance with federal law.138
The requirement of this recording mechanism demonstrates that the 
“Nevada DMV is already anticipating a situation wherein these AVs are 
133  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1117. 
134  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A (2014) (cited in Swanson, supra note 66, at 1118) 
135  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1118. 
136  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.190(2)(b) (2014); see also id. § 482A.190(2)(g) (requiring AVs 
to have a disengage system that can be activated “in multiple manners, including, without limitation, 
through the use of the brake, the accelerator pedal and the steering wheel”) (cited in Swason, supra note 
66, at 1120). 
137  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.190(2)(d) (2014) (cited in Swanson, supra note 66, at 1120). 
138  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.110(2)(b) (2014). 
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involved in accidents.”139 Such a device will no doubt be useful to 
determine not only civil liability, but criminal liability as well.140 AVs 
equipped with some type of apparatus that gathers and stores sensory 
information would be invaluable to determine whether a natural person 
would have been able to utilize a disengage mechanism and prevent a 
criminal act, such as some form of vehicular homicide. 
The Nevada regulations also include a geographic limitation. When the 
Nevada DMV issues a license permitting the use of an AV, a certificate is 
issued allowing the AV to only operate within a specific geographic area.141
To obtain a certificate to use the AV in other areas, the licensee must 
establish that the AV is “capable of being driven in the conditions of the 
proposed geographic location in compliance with the traffic laws and other 
laws applicable to drivers and motor vehicles” with that region.142 This 
provision of the regulations enables the Nevada DMV to control the 
specific areas where AVs will operate, allowing a certain plasticity in 
responding to policy concerns including public fear of cars that drive 
without human interaction. 
3.  The Laws of California 
California’s AV laws, as of February 2016, “are very similar to 
Florida’s.”143 However, there are some notable differences between the two 
states’ AV laws. A prime difference is California’s inclusion of the text, 
“[A] motor vehicle shall not be operated in autonomous mode on public 
roads in California except as permitted under . . . the regulations in this 
article.”144 The lack of similar language in Florida’s laws gives rise to 
inconsistent interpretations of whether an AV can be operated for non-
testing purposes. California law also requires that AV manufacturers have a 
test driver training program.145 California law, like Nevada, requires the AV 
manufacturer to report motor vehicle accidents involving AVs to the state 
within ten days.146 Florida AV law establishes operator liability by defining 
the term “operator” to mean the person who engages the AV,147 while 
California AV law is more aggressive and requires the AV manufacturer’s 
agent to sign a document “binding” the manufacturer to the AV for liability 
139  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1121. 
140  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1121; see also Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and AVs: 
Tort Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2012). 
141  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.120(2) (2014) (cited in Swanson, supra note 66, at 1121). 
142  NEV. ADMIN. CODE §482A.120(2) (cited in Swanson, supra note 66, at 1121). 
143  AV Report, supra note 73, at 2. 
144 See CAL. VEH. CODE § 227.00 (2012). 
145 See id. § 227.22. 
146 See id. § 227.44. 
147 See FLA. STAT. § 316.85(2) (2014). 
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purposes.148 California, like Florida and Nevada, requires $5 million of 
insurance.149
California, unlike Florida, has robust AV testing regulations. 
California requires an AV testing entity to submit a testing application.150
The fee for the application is $150 for the first ten AVs and up to twenty 
test drivers; each additional ten AVs and twenty test drivers cost an 
additional $50.151 If the application is granted by the state, the AV 
manufacturer obtains a “Manufacturer’s Testing Permit,” which is 
renewable at one year intervals by submission of a new application and 
application fee.152 California law also requires that a test driver have a valid 
test vehicle operator permit.153
California’s AV laws are on course for a dramatic change. On 
December 16, 2015, California’s DMV released proposed regulations for 
public operation of AVs.154 Public input on the proposed regulations closed 
in February of 2016.155 Among the proposed regulations is a provision 
stating that AVs “shall only be operated by the manufacturer or made 
available to the general public on no more than a leased basis.”156 This has 
the potential of driving AV developers out of the state.157
4.  The Laws of Michigan 
Generally, Michigan’s AV laws are similar to Nevada’s AV laws.158
Michigan, Florida, and Nevada all define an AV operator as the person that 
engages the AV technology, whether or not that person is physically present 
in the AV.159 Michigan, like Nevada but unlike Florida, requires AVs to 
have a special license plate.160 Michigan, unlike the other states, does not 
require $5 million dollars of insurance on an AV used for testing purposes, 
but rather requires only “proof satisfactory to the secretary of state that the 
148 See CAL. VEH. CODE § 227.16 (2012). 
149 See id. § 227.14(b). 
150 See id. § 227.26(a). 
151 See id. § 227.26(a)(1). 
152 See id. § 227.04. 
153 See id. § 227.20(a). 
154 Autonomous Vehicles in California, CAL. DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES, www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/
dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/auto.
155 Id.
156  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, art. 3.7, § 227.68(c) (2015). 
157 See e.g., Richard Read, California DMV Driving Autonomous Car Developers Off the Road 
& Out of State, The Car Connection (Feb. 23, 2016), www.thecarconnection.com/news/1102500_
california-dmv-driving-autonomous-car-developers-off-the-road-out-of-state.
158  AV Report, supra note 73, at 5. 
159 See 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 231, § 36. 
160 See id., § 244.
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vehicle is insured” in accordance with the Michigan insurance code.161
Michigan, like Florida, does not require an AV driver license endorsement 
or an AV operator permit.162
PART V. RESOLVING AV LEGAL ISSUES AND MAXIMIZING AV BENEFITS
A.  Manufacturer’s Criminal Liability 
AV technology will significantly improve vehicle safety, 
transportation and driver efficiency, and individual mobility.163 AV 
technology has a great potential to improve our quality of life, but only if 
the law changes in a fashion that promotes the wide spread use of the 
technology as it advances. However, the U.S. legal systems “acts to retard 
the introduction of new and beneficial technology.”164 As new technology 
emerges and is adopted, there is a concern that liability issues will impede 
innovation.165 AV liability issues will arise from users, consumers, 
insurance companies, and manufacturers.166 Insurance companies are a 
likely ally for the adoption of AV technology because the safety benefits of 
this technology will lower these companies’ bottom line.167 However, 
“manufacturers have been historically reluctant to incorporate safety 
technologies because of liability concerns.”168
In the past, manufacturers have demonstrated reluctance to adopt 
safety features that are now commonplace such as seat belts, cruise control, 
and airbags.169 Ford Motor Company and General Motors clashed over 
efforts to implement seat belts in cars.170 Regarding cruise control, “there 
161 Id. § 665. 
162 See 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 231. 
163 See Part III. 
164  Robert Dan Spendlove, Note, Speed Bumps on the Road to Progress: How Product Liability 
Slows the Introduction of Beneficial Technology—An Airbag Example, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1143, 
1143 (2005). 
165  Andrew P. Garza, Note, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of 
Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581, 605-09 (2012) (explaining that AVs will result in an 
increase in overall safety that will encourage manufacturers to adopt the technology despite initial 
liability issues). 
166  NIDHI KARLA ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AV TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2009). 
167 Id. at 19–21 (noting that the as human error is reduced, insurances costs are likely to be 
reduced as well). 
168  Garza, supra note 165, at 581. See also KARLA, supra note 166, at 22–32; Jameson M. 
Wetmore, Redefining Risks and Redistributing Responsibilities: Building Networks to Increase 
Automobile Safety, 29 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 377, 379 (2004) (stating that vehicle manufacturers 
are “wary of accepting the new liabilities and costs that would accompany” the design, production, and 
implementation of new or revised safety technologies). 
169  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1095. 
170  Garza, supra note 165, at 595–97 (“General Motors ‘consistently contested the value of 
belts, tried to minimize their importance for the industry and attempted to discourage their adoption.’”) 
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were concerns that cruise control technology may keep the throttle open and 
lead to wrecks.”171 Additionally, both vehicle safety experts and 
manufacturers were “concerned that a driver ‘with literally nothing to do 
except steer and ruminate’ would be ‘more likely to drop off for 40 fatal 
winks.’”172 Ultimately, “manufacturers have benefitted from the 
implementation of these technologies.”173
An examination of the history of air bag technology offers useful 
lessons learned. The National Highway Transportation and Safety Agency, 
in 1977, estimated that air bags could prevent over 12,000 vehicle collision 
fatalities and an additional 100,000 vehicle collision injuries.174 Part of the 
push to adopt air bag technology was an effort to reduce fatalities and 
injuries from vehicle collisions “by replacing a human responsibility [of 
using seat belts] with a technical artifact [self-deploying air bags].”175
Today, air bags “are installed in almost every vehicle due to changing 
public attitudes on vehicle safety and air bag expectations as well as 
improved technology and testing of airbags.”176 However, automakers were 
hesitant to adopt airbag technology, primarily because they were 
“frightened of taking on the liability that would accompany their 
involvement in an air bag strategy.”177 Ultimately, automakers embraced air 
bag technology, in large part, because their potential liability for occupants 
in vehicles equipped with air bags was greatly reduced as the attitude of 
viewing air bags favorably increased.178 AV technology is likely to enjoy 
the same upward trend of acceptability from the public as airbags.179
Federal or state legislation that would limit or protect against liability 
for AV manufacturers would help this socially beneficial technology 
become widely adopted.180 It is within the realm of the legislature to enact 
statutes or delegate agencies to create regulations that apportion liability, 
both civil and criminal, between AV manufacturers and users.181 Nevada’s 
(quoting Edward M. Swartz et al., Seat-Belt Injury Litigation: Defective Restraint Systems Can Result in 
Serious Injury, TRIAL, NOV. 1988, at 46, 47–48) (quotation marks omitted)). 
171  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1095, n.58. 
172  Garza, supra note 165, at 599 (footnote omitted) (quoting Frank Rowsome Jr., Educated Gas 
Pedal Keeps the Cops Away, POPULAR SCI., Jan. 1954, at 166). 
173  Swanson, supra note 66, at 1095. 
174  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 35 (1983) (citing 
42 Fed. Reg. 34,298 (July 5, 1977)). 
175  Wetmore, supra note 168, at 390. 
176  Goodrich, supra note 5, at 283–84. 
177  Wetmore, supra note 168, at 390. 
178 Id. at 391. 
179  Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1331–32. 
180 Id. at 1337. 
181  Dylan LeValley, Comment, Autonomous Vehicle Liability—Application of Common Carrier 
Liability, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 5, 17 (2013). 
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AV statute delegates regulatory power to the Nevada Department of Motor 
Vehicles.182 The statute requires the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles 
to create regulations that govern safety standards, testing methods, 
insurance requirements, and “such other requirements as the Department 
determines to be necessary.”183 Legislatures should be proactive in 
establishing statutes or regulations that apportion liability to prevent the 
question of liability involving AVs from being brought “before a court as a 
matter of first impression with no statutory direction.”184
In order to ensure that manufacturer liability does not become “a 
barrier that blocks the introduction of this socially beneficial new 
technology,”185 legislatures should act to provide manufacturers with 
“liability protection, or preemption, to ensure AVs are not unduly impeded 
by liability concerns.”186 There is historic precedent for new and emerging 
technologies to be protected by legislative efforts to limit liability.187 The 
Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act was enacted in 1957 to 
limit liability to the nuclear industry.188 In the transportation industry, the 
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 provided small plane (and 
small plane parts) manufacturers with immunity from liability for eighteen 
years.189
Limited liability protections were enacted for vaccine manufacturers in 
the interest of greater public safety.190 These federal laws were passed 
primarily because the “public health benefit of vaccines is undeniable, yet 
they are so frequently the source of lawsuits that federal preemption laws 
had to be passed to protect their manufacturers.”191 The Public Readiness 
and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 provides vaccine manufacturers 
with immunity from liability for harm resulting from vaccinations that take 
place during public health emergencies.192 In 1986, the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act was enacted to limit liability for manufacturers of 
182  NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.100 (2014). 
183 Id.
184  LeValley, supra note 181, at 17. 
185  Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1340. 
186 Id. at 1340. 
187 Id. at 1337. 
188  42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006) (cited in Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1337). 
189  Pub. L. No. 103-298, §(a), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006) 
(cited in Marchant, supra note 31, at 1338). 
190  Eva B. Stensvad, Note, Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: The Vaccine Act and 
Preemption of Design Defect Claims, 95 MINN. L. REV. 315, 323 (2010) (cited in Goodrich, supra note 
5, at 284); see also Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1335–36. 
191  Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1331 (citing National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34 (1986)). 
192  42 U.S.C. § 329 (2006) (cited in Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1338). 
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children’s vaccines.193 State legislatures have enacted similar liability 
limitations in the area of tort reform, specifically for medical malpractice, 
largely “to ameliorate the liability concerns faced by vulnerable, but 
promising, technologies.”194
The enormous safety benefits that AVs could provide for society 
demand that the legislature take proactive measures to ensure that liability 
will not hinder the implantation and adoption of this emerging technology. 
The model of liability protection established for vaccine manufactures 
should be looked to as legislators seek to maximize the benefits of this new 
AV technology while still giving persons that suffer harm a legal remedy as 
well as advancing the aims of the criminal liability regime. 
Some legal scholars have suggested that AV manufacturers should be 
held to the same liability standards as common carriers.195 This suggestion 
relies heavily on the idea that AVs are like common carriers because “they 
will engage in transportation services, their services will be widely 
available to the public, and the passenger’s safety is not entirely within the 
control of the passenger.”196 This argument assumes that the manufacturer 
is the operator of the vehicle.197 This assumption is flawed because a 
manufacturer of an AV, unlike the common carrier operator, will have little, 
if any, control of the vehicle after it is sold. While a manufacturer will have 
control over the design and implementation of the autonomous technology, 
it will be up to the user to conduct routine maintenance on the vehicle. Due 
to this partitioning between manufacturing and maintaining the autonomous 
technology, the heightened duty of carje imposed on common carriers198
should not guide criminal liability for AV manufacturers. 
The aims of the criminal liability regime are, in important part, to deter 
and punish conduct that society has deemed undesirable.199 AV technology 
represents a new paradigm in automotive safety, efficiency, and mobility. 
193  2242 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-4 (2006) (cited in Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 
1338).
194  Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1338 (citing Fred J. Hellinger & William E. Encinosa, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, The Impact of State 
Laws Limiting Malpractice Awards on the Geographic Distribution of Physicians 3 (2003), 
www.ahrq.gov/research/tortcaps/tortcaps.htm. 
195  LeValley, supra note 181, at 20. 
196 Id. at 12. 
197 Id. at 17–18 (“[W]e assume that a manufacturer of an autonomous vehicleAV is analogous 
to an operator of the vehicle . . . [because] the manufacturer of the autonomous vehicleAV, like a carrier 
operations, will have exclusive control over the capabilities and limitations of the mode of 
transportation—the autonomous technology.”). 
198 Id. at 1215 (noting that common carriers owe “the highest duty of care” to their users). 
199 See e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765 (2010). Accord FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(b) (2015) (“The primary 
purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender.”). 
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This is an emerging technology, and as such there will likely be real world 
harms as the automotive industry transitions to fully autonomous 
vehicles.200 These harms will probably include the type of incidents that 
carry with them criminal liability, such as serious bodily harm and death. 
However, the overall benefit to society that this technology will provide 
substantially outweighs the need to deter or punish manufacturers under the 
criminal liability regime. 
Yes, society deserves a remedy for when autonomous technology fails, 
and manufacturers should be held to a reasonable standard when designing 
and producing a potentially dangerous product to the market. The solution 
can be found in the historic precedent of limited liability for vaccine 
manufacturers. Simply put, existing products liability law201 is well suited 
to handle civil liability issues for AV manufacturers,202 and AV technology 
is too important to hold manufacturers criminally liable for their product. 
Florida law already provides some level of liability protection for 
manufactures. In Florida, the manufacturer of a traditional automobile is 
exempt from liability if a third party converts the traditional vehicle into an 
AV.203 For the reasons stated previously in this section, specifically to 
maximize and enable the policy benefits from AVs,204 Florida should 
relegate manufacturer liability of AVs to comport with existing tort law. 
B.  Individual Criminal Liability 
The primary criminal liability issue that must be addressed is “that our 
current legal system assumes that the person in the driver’s seat is in control 
of the vehicle, which is not necessarily the case with AVs.”205 Even with the 
current limitations of autonomous technology, almost all strict liability 
traffic offenses will be eliminated.206 What remains is intent-based offenses 
and offenses that require a person to “operate” the vehicle. The problem 
with how these offenses are applied and analyzed for AVs is evidenced by 
the term “self-driving car.” Is a person inside the vehicle a passenger or an 
operator?
“Is the ‘driver’ of an [AV] like the engineer of a train or pilot of an 
aircraft on ‘autopilot,’ or is she simply a passenger, with little or no control 
200  These same types of harm will no doubt occur after the transition phase, just to a lesser 
extent.
201 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1998). 
202 See, e.g., Marchant & Lindor, supra note 31, at 1321. 
203  FLA. STAT. § 316.86(2) (2015) (“The original manufacturer of a vehicle converted by a third 
party into an autonomous vehicle shall not be liable in . . . any legal action brought against the original 
manufacturer . . . unless the alleged defect was present in the vehicle as originally manufactured.”). 
204 See Part III. 
205  Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1158 (citing Beiker, supra note 3, at 1149–52). 
206 See Gomes, supra note 25; see also Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1158–59.
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of the vehicle’s behavior?”207
The answer to this question should be that a person inside an AV while 
operating in autonomous mode is presumed to be a passenger. This is the 
answer to the operator/passenger question because although the person 
inside the vehicle is indeed controlling the vehicle, by giving instructions 
such as the destination, the vehicle itself is in control of how those 
instructions are carried out. The test should be whether the person inside the 
vehicle is operating the vehicle in any meaningful way. The NHTSA has 
weighed in on this issue, determining that the software controlling an AV is 
the “driver” and anyone inside the vehicle is a mere “occupant.”208 Nobody 
would seriously argue that a passenger in a taxicab is operating the vehicle 
merely because that passenger told the driver where to go. In the case of 
AVs, the car itself is operating the vehicle and the person inside, issuing 
instructions, should be held to similar criminal liability standards as the 
passenger of a taxicab. 
Laws that make driving under the influence a crime are challenged 
head-on by AVs. To the average consumer, purchasing an AV might be 
thought of as purchasing a personal taxi. This same person may presume 
that after a night of drinking, their AV would be capable of “delivering the 
intoxicated person home safely without any further interaction.”209
The most obvious legal issue from a criminal liability standpoint is 
created by the following scenario. An intoxicated person gets in their AV. 
The vehicle begins to drive the intoxicated person home. The AV is 
equipped with an alert and disengage system (required in Florida).210 The 
vehicle is involved in an accident that results in death or serious bodily 
harm. The legal issue is causation: whether, but for the person’s 
intoxication, the accident would have occurred. Because “[t]he possibility 
of removing drunk drivers from the road is one of the most prominent 
benefits [AVs] might provide,”211 legislatures should recognize that the 
person inside the vehicle is a passenger. To do otherwise would mean that 
instances of drunk driving are not as effectively reduced. Additionally, if 
this scenario were to substitute being blind for being intoxicated, the 
promise of increased mobility would also be strongly hindered. 
207  Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1160. 
208  David Shepardson and Paul Lienert, Exclusive: In Boost to Self-Driving Cars, U.S. Tells 
Google Computers Can Qualify as Drivers, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016, 1:14pm) (“NTHSA will interpret 
‘driver’ in the context of Google’s described motor vehicle design as reffering to the [self-driving 
system], and not to any of the vehicle occupants.”) (quoting a NHTSA letter dated February 4, 2016) 
(alterations in the original). 
209 Id. at 1163 (describing this concept as “an ‘I’m drunk, take me home’ button”). 
210 See FLA. STAT. § 319.145. 
211  Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1163. 
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There is another DUI situation that legislatures should address 
regarding AVs equipped with alert and disengage systems. What if an 
intoxicated person, due to their normal faculties being impaired, disengages 
autonomous operation and the result isof the vehicle, which results in death 
or serious bodily harm? Technology could provide for a “method of 
triggering this disengage option [through] the inclusion of in-car 
breathalyzers.”212 A legislative solution would be to recognize the crime of 
“autonomous DUI” in these situations. This could function similarly to 
situations where courts have found people to be in control of a vehicle 
simply by having their keys in their pocket, sleeping in their vehicle, while 
intoxicated.213
The law in Florida is clear that some human is always the operator, 
even when the vehicle is empty.214 The law in Florida also requires a system 
that alerts the operator if the autonomous technology fails215 and a 
disengagement system that is “easily accessible to the operator”216 to allow 
the person to take control of the vehicle in the event of a malfunction.217
Florida legislators should, instead, borrow from Nevada’s laws and require 
that “[i]f the driver is not present or is unable to safely take control of the 
vehicle, the vehicle must safely cause itself to come to a stop.”218
Noncriminal moving violations raise an interesting legal question, 
whether it is appropriate to punish, by issuance of a fine, for a traffic 
violation caused by the AV The majority of traffic offenses in Florida are 
strict liability, noncriminal traffic infractions.219 Strict liability offenses lack 
a mens rea element because they are not concerned as much with moral 
culpability as they are with deterrence.220 If an AV, while in autonomous 
mode and without a physically present operator, for whatever reason, fails 
to obey a police officer directing traffic, why should the human operator be 
issued a ticket? Florida’s current AV legal regime would allow this human 
operator to be issued a ticket because that is the letter of the law.221 The 
operator is not morally blameworthy, but moral blame is not contemplated 
by noncriminal strict liability offenses.222 Yet issuing a ticket to the operator 
212 Id. at 1163. 
213 See, e.g., City of Naperville v. Watson, 677 N.E. 2d 955 (Ill. 1997) (cited in Douma & 
Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1163). 
214 See FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (2014). 
215 See FLA. STAT. § 319.145(1)(c) (2015). 
216  FLA. STAT. § 319.145(1)(a) (2015).
217 See FLA. STAT. § 319.145(1)(c) (2015). 
218  Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1161 (citing NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 16(2)(d)(2)). 
219 See FLA. STAT. § 316 (2015). 
220 See Miller, supra note 50, at 22. 
221 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.1945 (2015). 
222 See Miller, supra note 50, at 21. 
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here does not further the aims of deterrence either. Here, the operator has no 
control of how the AV functions once it is engaged, and no amount of fines 
or tickets will change this. 
Imagine being issued a ticket every time your smartphone went out of 
service. Would these tickets somehow make you stay in service? Of course 
not, and the same concept is at play with AVs. If anyone should be liable in 
this instance it is the manufacturer. This is similar to when a speedometer 
malfunctions resulting in a speeding ticket. The difference being that in the 
case of the faulty speedometer, an actual person with a valid driver license 
is present in the vehicle exercising control of the vehicle, and the argument 
can be made that the operator should realize how fast the vehicle is 
traveling based on context and experience. 
C.  Crimes Involving AVs 
If a third party were to take control of an AV through hacking, a host 
of criminal issues are raised. If someone (regardless of whether the person 
is considered a passenger or operator) is inside the vehicle at the time the 
third party takes control, is this theft, kidnapping, carjacking, or something 
else entirely? Existing statutes may adequately address this issue.223 State 
legislatures should enact new (or amend existing) statutes to address a 
situation in which an AV is hacked, and then involved in an accident that 
causes death or seriously bodily harm. 
One issue that needs to be resolved is raised in the following 
hypothetical. An AV has an alert and disengage system. The law states that 
a person with access to this system is considered to be in control of the 
vehicle. The vehicle is hacked, and is now controlled by a third party. The 
alert and disengage system still functions. The AV, under the control of the 
hacker, kills a pedestrian. This death would have been avoided had the 
virtual carjacking victim utilized the disengage system. The issue that must 
be addressed by the legislature is whether “the ultimate responsibility for 
safe operation of the vehicle . . . remain[s] with the person with the ability 
to [use the disengage].”224 The legislature should be proactive and place 
criminal liability on the hacker because the hacker’s illicit actions are the 
proximate cause of the death. 
AVs could potentially be used to transport contraband such as drugs 
because: (1) they obey all traffic laws resulting in a lower risk of being 
stopped by law enforcement; and (2) they can be operated without anyone 
in the vehicle so that if the vehicle is stopped and the contraband is found, 
the owner of the contraband may escape capture. Given the possible use of 
223 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 812.133 (1993). 
224  Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 4, at 1165. 
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AVs as drug mules or otherwise transporting contraband, should AVs have 
some type of “black box” style data recorder? Nevada requires a black box 
type system in AVs that captures thirty seconds of data before a collision 
occurs.225 This type of data capturing system could be accessed by law 
enforcement, subject to a traditional search analysis, even when the AV has 
not been in a collision. In light of the recent legal issues surrounding the use 
of GPS tracking devices on vehicles,226 an extension of data collection 
requirement beyond collision and safety reporting seems likely to give rise 
to Fourth Amendment issues. A better policy would be to have law 
enforcement investigate, without resorting to data snooping, AVs found 
laden with contraband but without anyone physically present. 
D.  Searches of AVs 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
individuals from unreasonable intrusion by the federal government.227 The 
Fourth Amendment has been incorporated against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.228 Although the Supreme Court has stated that a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is greater in a home than in an 
automobile,229 the Court has also stated that “people are not shorn of all 
Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto public 
sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the 
sidewalks into their automobiles.”230 There are numerous Fourth 
Amendment issues raised by the use of AVs.231
225 See FLA. DEP’T. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Autonomous Vehicle Report,
#13–008, at 4 (2014). 
226 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the attachment of a GPS 
tracking device to a vehicle and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle, was a search 
within the Fourth Amendment). 
227 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The Fourth Amendment “has evolved into an important part of every citizen’s procedural rights against 
government intrusion into personal affairs.” Daniel R. Dinger & John S. Dinger, Deceptive Drug 
Checkpoints and Individual Suspicion: Can Law Enforcement Really Deceive Its Way into a Drug 
Trafficking Conviction?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (cited by Roseman, supra note 17, at 16). 
228 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the right against unreasonable 
search and seizure); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (incorporating the various warrant 
requirements against the states); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (incorporating the standards for 
determining whether a warrantless search or seizure was “unreasonable” against the states). 
229 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153–54, 154 n.22 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
230  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979). 
231 See generally Roseman, supra note 17, at 3. 
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Generally, a person has standing to bring a Fourth Amendment 
challenge when the person is seized232 or when the person has an 
expectation of privacy in the area searched.233 Not all interactions between 
law enforcement and individuals are seizures or searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.234 However, it is well settled that the Fourth Amendment is 
implicated when law enforcement stops an automobile.235 Once an 
automobile has been stopped by law enforcement, an officer must have a 
warrant,236 obtain consent,237 or establish probable cause in order to conduct 
a search of the vehicle.238 Setting aside the issue of how law enforcement 
stops an AV (which dutifully obeys all traffic regulations and laws),239 I 
will focus on the procedural issues presented when an AV is searched 
subsequent to a lawful stop. 
In Florida, the operator of an AV is the person that “causes the 
vehicle’s autonomous technology to engage, regardless of whether the 
person is physically present in the vehicle.”240 This definition of “operator” 
leads to legally unusual and unique situations pertaining to who has 
standing to challenge a search of an AV. If the operator of an AV is 
physically present in the vehicle, then the traditional jurisprudence 
regarding standing to challenge a search of an automobile applies. 
However, in Florida, because the operator of an AV need not be physically 
present, the issue of who has standing to challenge a search of an AV 
becomes unclear. I will address the following scenarios: (1) an AV with a 
physically present operator; (2) an AV without anyone physically present; 
and (3) an AV with a passenger that is not the operator. 
232 See Prouse, 440 U.S., supra note 230, at 653 (“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its 
occupant constituted a ‘seizure.’”); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007) (holding that an 
automobile passenger was seized and thus entitled to challenge the stop under the Fourth Amendment). 
233 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (outlining the two 
prongs of Fourth Amendment privacy: (1) that a person must have an expectation of privacy; and (2) 
that expectation must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 
148 (finding no standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment when defendant was a 
“mere passenger” in an automobile); see generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (4th ed. 2004). 
234 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 
235 See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254 (“A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to 
challenge the government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘by means of physical 
force or show of authority,’ terminates or restrains his freedom of movement.” (quoting Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)); Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (“[S]topping an automobile and 
detaining its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ . . . even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief.” (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). 
236 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1975). 
237 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). 
238 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
239 For a thoughtful discussion of establishing reasonable suspicion to stop an AV, see Roseman, 
supra note 17, at 33–39, 41. 
240  FLA. STAT. § 316.85(2) (2015). 
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In the first scenario the AV’s operator is physically present and a 
search occurs subsequent to a lawful traffic stop. This scenario should not 
be treated any differently than a traditional search subsequent to a lawful 
traffic stop. In this scenario a law enforcement officer is able to talk face-to-
face with the operator, ask routine questions, determine the operator’s final 
destination, run a search for outstanding warrants, and ask for consent to 
conduct a search. Because the operator is physically present and able to act 
in every as a traditional driver at this point (when the AV is no longer being 
driven), there is no reason to deviate from the traditional search analysis in 
this scenario. Law enforcement will obtain a warrant, consent from the 
operator, or establish probable cause. The operator will have standing to 
challenge the search. 
When an AV without anyone physically present is searched 
subsequent to a lawful stop,241 traditional search analysis is substantially 
unaltered. In this scenario a law enforcement officer cannot speak to the AV 
operator to obtain consent. It has been suggested that implied consent laws 
should be enacted for AVs without a physically present operator.242 This 
lack of face-to-face dialogue also creates a hurdle in establishing probable 
cause because the law enforcement office cannot utilize his or her 
observations of the operator’s demeanor or ask the operator where his or her 
final destination is. Aside from this lack of interaction between law 
enforcement and the operator, the search analysis is unchanged. Essentially, 
the AV without a physically present operator will be treated like a parked 
car with retained mobility. In this scenario, the issue of standing to 
challenge the search is also based on traditional search analysis. The 
operator would have standing to challenge a search subsequent to a lawful 
stop even when not physically present because he or she has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, just like he or she would have in a parked car or 
luggage on a public bus.243
The final scenario, in which the person inside the AV is not the 
operator, is the most interesting. The search analysis is almost the same as 
when the operator is present in the AV, except that a law enforcement 
officer would utilize the passenger’s demeanor and statements regarding the 
final destination. Also, an officer may be able to obtain consent from the 
passenger, if the passenger is authorized to consent to the search.244
241  Although an AV obeys all traffic laws and regulations flawlessly,  in Florida a police officer 
may stop a vehicle for a safety inspection “upon reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle is unsafe.” 
FLA. STAT. § 316.610(1) (2015). 
242  Roseman, supra note 17, at 41. 
243 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (holding that a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a piece of luggage on a bus traveling long distances). 
244 See Roseman, supra note 17, at 44–46. 
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The operator of the AV would likely have standing to challenge a 
search subsequent to a lawful stop, for the reasons noted previously. 
However, the issue of whether the passenger has standing to challenge is 
more complex. Courts do not require ownership of a vehicle to assert 
standing to challenge a search.245 However, in Rakas v. Illinois, the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant who was the passenger in an 
automobile did not have standing to challenge the search of the automobile 
because they did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area 
searched.246 It is unlikely that a court will find that a passenger in an AV 
operated by someone else (such as a child or other person without a driver 
license) has reasonable expectation of privacy in the AV itself because 
being a passenger in a “car with the permission of its owner is not 
determinative of whether [a passenger] had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched.”247 However, if a 
passenger who is not the owner of the AV is able to consent to a search, 
“then that same non-owner must have a protected privacy interest. The 
scope of the authority sufficient to grant a valid consent can hardly be 
broader than the contours of protected privacy.”248
E.  Nevada’s Legislation as a Model 
Florida should follow Nevada’s lead and amend the AV statute to 
include language to the effect of “The Department of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles is directed to adopt rules providing for the implementation 
and the use of AVs.”249 This would allow administrative flexibility to 
maximize the benefits of AVs. Specifically, the delegation of regulatory 
powers to the Department of Highway and Safety and Motor Vehicles 
would allow for adolescents, elderly, and disabled persons the same 
mobility that licensed drivers would have. If the law in Florida allows an 
AV to operate on public roadways without anyone inside,250 what’s the 
245 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548–49 (11th Cir. 1987) (A defendant who 
borrows a car from a friend has standing to assert an expectation of privacy.); United States v. Arango, 
912 F.2d 441, 445-46 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that a defendant has standing to challenge a search 
when he has “gained possession [of the area searched] from the owner or someone with the authority to 
grant possession”); United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (“An unauthorized 
driver [of a rental car] may have standing to challenge a search if he or she has received permission to 
use the car.”). But see People v. Cacioppo, 479 N.Y.S. 2d 264, 265–66 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1984) 
(holding that the occasional use of a vehicle did not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the defendant was not the actual owner, the doors were not locked at the time of the search, and 
he did not have his own set of keys to the vehicle). 
246 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 (1978). 
247 Id. at 148. 
248 Id. at 163 (White, J., dissenting). 
249  This language is a slight alteration of FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (11) (2015). 
250 See generally FLA. STAT. § 316 (2015). 
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harm of allowing a blind person to sit inside? 
PART VI. CONCLUSION
AV technology will improve the safety, efficiency, and mobility 
benefits of our existing automobile infrastructure. In order to maximize 
these improvements, a new legal regime must be created. This new regime 
needs to recognize that an operator of an AV may actually be a mere 
passenger. This new regime must recognize that more often than not, an AV 
is its own operator. Florida’s traffic laws and motor vehicle regulations 
should reflect this concept. The Nevada statutes governing AVs should be 
used as model legislation. This new regime must also address crimes 
against AVs, such as virtual carjackings, and autonomous crimes, and the 
use of an AV in the furtherance of a crime. Existing law can be readily 
adapted to address these crimes. By creating a new legal regime for AVs, 
the goals of deterrence and punishment can be met while achieving the 
benefits from autonomous technology. 
